	D425schO order to show cause	1				
1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT					
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK					
3	THEODORE F. SCHROEDER, et al.,					
4	Plaintiffs,					
5	v. 12 CIV. 9413 (PKC)					
6	BRIAN S. COHEN and PINTEREST,					
7	Defendants.					
8	x					
9	April 2, 2013 10:30 a.m.					
10	Before:					
11	HON. P. KEVIN CASTEL,					
12	District Judge					
13	APPEARANCES					
14	MONTGOMERY, MCCRACKEN, WALKER & RHOADS, LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs					
15	BY: SIDNEY S. LIEBESMAN CHARLES PALELLA					
16	STEVEN PACHMAN					
17	QUINN, EMANUEL, URQUHART, OLIVER & HEDGES, LLP Attorneys for Defendant Pinterest					
18	BY: MICHAEL CARLINSKY RACHEL KASSABIAN					
19	JENNER & BLOCK					
20	Attorneys for Defendant Cohen BY: ANDREW BART					
21	BRIAN FISCHER					
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D425schO order to show cause 1 (Case called) THE DEPUTY CLERK: Plaintiff's ready? 2 3 MR. LIEBESMAN: We are. 4 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Please state your appearance. 5 MR. LIEBESMAN: Sidney Liebesman from Montgomery McCracken, your Honor; good morning. 6 7 THE COURT: Good morning. It is pronounced Liebesman? MR. LIEBESMAN: Liebesman. 8 9 THE COURT: Good morning. 10 MR. PALELLA: Charles Palella from Montgomery McCracken as well. 11 12 THE COURT: All right. 13 MR. PACHMAN: And Steven Pachman from Montgomery 14 McCracken as well. 15 MR. CARLINSKY: Good morning, your Honor. Michael Carlinsky from Quinn Emanuel for Pinterest. 16 17 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Carlinsky. MS. KASSABIAN: Kassabian also with Quinn Emanuel for 18 Pinterest. 19 20 THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Kassabian. 21 MR. FISCHER: Brian Fischer from Jenner & Block for 22 Mr. Cohen.

MR. BART: Andrew Bart from Jenner & Block for

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Fischer.

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Mr. Cohen.

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THE COURT: Good to see you.

This Court issued an order to show cause on March 15th and supplemented it with a second order on March 18th and let me hear from Mr. Liebesman, Mr. Palella, Mr. Pachman whether they have any further written submission that they, as individuals, wish to make, or the firm of Montgomery McCracken wishes to make.

MR. LIEBESMAN: Your Honor, there are some additional points that we would like to make. I'm happy to make it here or orally. If your Honor would prefer to have a written submission then I would ask leave for the opportunity to do that in light of the nature of the order to show cause.

As your Honor knows, we are not here upon motion. The order was issued sua sponte.

THE COURT: Let me first find out whether there are any written materials you wish to submit today in response to the order to show cause.

MR. LIEBESMAN: Your Honor, there are additional case citations that we would like the Court to consider and the advisory committee notes to Rule 11.

THE COURT: Do you have them? Do you want to give them to me orally?

MR. LIEBESMAN: I can give them to you orally, your Honor.

THE COURT: I have a bunch of other questions to ask

no, we do not.

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1	you. Right now the first question is as to written submissions				
2	and you're going to give me the case citations orally, is that				
3	correct?				
4	MR. LIEBESMAN: Yes, your Honor.				
5	THE COURT: Now is that true for you, Mr. Palella.				
6	MR. PALELLA: Yes, your Honor.				
7	THE COURT: Is that true for you, Mr. Pachman?				
8	MR. PACHMAN: Yes, your Honor.				
9	THE COURT: Do any of you wish to call any witnesses				
10	or present any testimony?				
11	MR. LIEBESMAN: No, your Honor.				
12	MR. PALELLA: No, your Honor.				
13	MR. PACHMAN: No, your Honor.				
14	THE COURT: Is Montgomery McCracken separately				
15	represented here today?				
16	MR. LIEBESMAN: No, your Honor. The firm's general				
17	counsel has been involved in this process subsequent to the				
18	issuance of the order to show cause but the firm itself is not				
19	separately represented by counsel.				
20	THE COURT: Okay.				
21	Does any defendant have anything they either wish to				
22	submit or any witness they wish to call with regard to the				
23	orders to show cause in this case?				
24	MR. CARLINSKY: On behalf of Pinterest, your Honor,				

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MR. FISCHER: Same on behalf of Mr. Cohen.

THE COURT: Then I will give Mr. Liebesman,
Mr. Palella and Mr. Pachman and the Montgomery McCracken firm
an opportunity to say anything it wishes including citations to
case law; anything else you wish to say this is the time to say
it.

MR. LIEBESMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

We are here before the Court, as your Honor mentioned, on the order to show cause issued on March 15th and then there was a subsequent order to show cause issued to the firm itself on March 18th. Because we are not here on a Rule 11 motion initiated by a party in this case it is our position that the heightened standard of bad faith under the Pennie Second Circuit decision which the citation for the record is 323 F.3d 86 and it is a March 14, 2003 decision.

Your Honor, in 1993 Rule 11 was amended and one of the amendments was to provide a safe harbor provision which did not previously exist. The safe harbor provision was intended to give a party that's being challenged under Rule 11 an opportunity to remedy whatever the alleged deficiency is should the party agree that it be warranted because orders that are issued sua sponte deny a party of the ability to utilize a safe harbor provision or a functional equivalent of a safe harbor provision.

THE COURT: Well, do they deny a party the ability to

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utilize a safe harbor or is there not a safe harbor created in the case of a sua sponte order?

MR. LIEBESMAN: There is not a safe harbor created.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LIEBESMAN: I guess you could say, your Honor, that there is an opportunity to because you could do what we did which was immediately acknowledge well in advance of your Honor's deadline that your Honor was correct. I'm happy to get into how embarrassing this is. I'm happy to get into the effect that this has had with me personally and members of the firm and the firm itself, a firm that has been around for a hundred years, but it is something that we acknowledged immediately. And so, to that extent we believe that we did take steps to remedy it by acknowledging that the Court was correct, the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of there no longer being a diversity of citizenship as of the filing of the amendment to the complaint in late February.

So, under the advisory committee notes to the 1993 amendments, your Honor, there is a comment that says that since show cause orders will ordinarily be issued only in situations that are akin to a contempt of Court, the rule does not provide a safe harbor to a litigant for withdrawing a claim defense etc. --

THE COURT: Slow down. Go ahead.

MR. LIEBESMAN: -- after a show cause order has been

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issued on the Court's own initiative.

I think the critical language that is there in the advisory committee notes which the Pennie Second Circuit court picked up on and other courts subsequent here in the Southern District of New York be akin to contempt. And while the mistake, an honest oversight that was made by my firm and I take full responsibility, it did not rise to the level of contempt of Court.

THE COURT: When you say mistake, what are you referring to?

MR. LIEBESMAN: The failure to realize that by adding Skoop -- aside from the LLC with the individual members, dealing with Skoop itself which is easy, it is a Delaware corporation -- by adding Skoop as an additional plaintiff by way of the amended complaint on February 28th we lost completely diversity because Pinterest, while it is headquartered in California so, your Honor, we think of it as California, but it is incorporated in the State of Delaware just as is Skoop -- Skoop Media Associates is the formal name of that plaintiff. So that was the mistake, your Honor, by not realizing that, that was --

THE COURT: Well, my order points out that that was not the only shortcoming. The complaint failed to allege the citizenship of plaintiff Schroeder. It failed to allege the citizenship of Defendant Brian Cohen. It failed to allege the

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principal place of business of Plaintiff Skoop Media

Associates. It failed to allege the citizenship of the natural persons and any entities who are members of Rendezvoo LLC. It did all that separate and in addition to the inclusion of two Delaware corporations, one as plaintiff, one as defendant corporation. I don't hear you addressing them.

MR. LIEBESMAN: Okay. I'm happy to, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not asking you to, I just don't hear you addressing them. I hear you describing this mistake as adding a plaintiff Delaware corporation and a defendant Delaware corporation and I think the order to show cause is much broader than that. That's why I'm curious to hear you characterize it as a mistake in this one limited respect.

MR. LIEBESMAN: Okay, if your Honor understood that from me to mean that was the only mistake made, that is not correct. The Court is absolutely correct on the other issues it had raised. The reason why I focus on the issue of adding Skoop in the amended complaint is because it goes to the heart of this Court's subject matter jurisdiction or the lack thereof.

The other points are very valid, residence and citizenship is not synonymous. Understood. No debate about that. That, however, if the initial complaint were -- if this were recognized when the initial complaint was made, it could, your Honor, arguably be an easy fix. We amended the complaint

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to substitute citizenship for the word "residents" in both of case of Mr. Schroeder who is a citizen of New Jersey and Mr. Cohen who is a citizen of New York. I think one reason why the defendants didn't bring it up on their own when the initial complaint was filed in late December is because in understanding that there was complete diversity at the time we were incorrect in using the word "residents" but they could just as easily be replaced with the word "citizenship" and the Court would have, at that time, retained subject matter jurisdiction. The distinction that I'm making is that this goes to the heart of this Court's jurisdiction, that being it can't be remedied, there is no complete diversity anymore.

THE COURT: What about the failure to allege the principal place of business of Skoop?

MR. LIEBESMAN: Well, your Honor, that's correct, we did not allege the principal place of business of Skoop. One of the issues that your Honor may be aware of from the letter writing campaign is that the parties involved in this process, there are a total of four individuals, there were three Columbia law students that really came up with the idea that became Pinterest. They brought in what they expected to be a sophisticated venture capitalist, that's defendant Cohen.

Defendant Cohen joins this group, loves the idea, expresses his love of the idea, it is Mr. Schroeder's idea, no one is going to dispute the fact he lived and breathed this and spent

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thousands of hours developing the idea and writing code, but after he developed a personality conflict with Mr. Schroeder he took the idea and gave it to the people that eventually founded it, Pinterest. In so doing they continued to ignore all the corporate formalities of Rendezvoo, the prior LLC, and Skoop.

So, Skoop, while the party, Mr. Schroeder circulated a termination agreement to try to create some formality to terminate Skoop as a viable entity, Mr. Cohen just didn't even respond to the efforts to do that. Why? Because part of the termination provided that you would not take any of the ideas and give them to anybody else. Mr. Cohen probably by then had already done that and that, I think, will be born out in discovery but there is little dispute that Mr. Cohen is on both sides, works with Mr. Schroeder, takes the idea and all of a sudden becomes the first investor in Pinterest.

So, your Honor, what is the principal place of business of Skoop? Skoop exists, it is a Delaware corporation, it exists but not more than that. It doesn't engage in business since Mr. Cohen, the defendant deadlocked the company and just everything went — they all went their way, they didn't know he was going to take their idea and go his own way himself.

THE COURT: But this is a court of limited jurisdiction. You are electing to include Skoop as a party.

Now, Skoop may be a shell, there may be nothing to Skoop. It

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may not do anything but you're electing to make it a party to this action and you're invoking the jurisdiction of this Court and Section 1332 could not be more plain as to what it requires if you seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to a corporation.

MR. LIEBESMAN: Your Honor, the only thing I would say to that is we are not looking to seek to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court in the present tense. We have acknowledged that by joining Skoop as a plaintiff in the case when we amended the complaint in late February this Court lost the subject matter jurisdiction and that was a point that we raised immediately with your Honor well in advance of a deadline to say the Court is correct, there is no subject matter jurisdiction, and we are not opposed to the entry of an order dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction so we're not looking to continue to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court.

THE COURT: Yes, but so the record is clear, when you say you raised it immediately you raised it immediately after the defects, the several defects were called to your attention.

MR. LIEBESMAN: Absolutely, your Honor.

THE COURT: And what about the allegations with regard to Rendezvoo LLC and the failure to allege the citizenship of the members of the LLC?

MR. LIEBESMAN: Again, your Honor, the Court is

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correct, we did not allege the citizenship of any of the members of the LLC; I'm not sure if we did which is why I focus on Skoop. I'm not a hundred percent sure if we did that that would have defeated the subject matter jurisdiction because there is one member who I'm not sure what state he is a citizen of. But, the Court is correct. I don't know what to say, your Honor. It is embarrassing. It is an oversight that cannot be explained.

endeavoring to look at the objective reasonableness of the conduct. It seems to me that it may be of some bearing if it is a single error in isolation rather than a pattern of errors in the same pleading that would bear some relevance here. I would think that would be a relevant indication here of the level of care and attention paid to invoking the jurisdiction of the Court. One error in isolation may look differently if it is coupled with a host of other errors. That's the only thing.

MR. LIEBESMAN: Your Honor, and just so the record is clear, it is our position that the test — the standard to be applied is not objective reasonableness. It is bad faith based on the Pennie decision.

THE COURT: Well, I will take a look at the Pennie decision and --

MR. LIEBESMAN: Sorry, your Honor; there is one other

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1 cite I wanted to get on the record. Maybe now is a good time? 2 THE COURT: Yes. Please. 3 MR. LIEBESMAN: And there are other cases it is Brous 4 & Company. 5 THE COURT: B-R-O-U-S. 6 MR. LIEBESMAN: It is unreported Westlaw, 2004 Westlaw 7 1367451 and that's a June 16, 2004 decision subsequent to the Pennie. 8 9 THE COURT: Of what court? 10 MR. LIEBESMAN: The Southern District of New York, 11 your Honor; Judge Haight. 12 THE COURT: And the date of the decision? 13 MR. LIEBESMAN: June 16, 2004. 14 THE COURT: Now, is it your position, therefore, that 15 the improper invocation of diversity jurisdiction can never be the subject of a Rule 11 sanction if raised sua sponte. 16 17 MR. LIEBESMAN: Absolutely not. That's one of the 18 reasons we didn't voluntarily dismiss because we didn't want it 19 to appear to the Court that we were trying to avoid your 20 Honor's analysis and evaluation pursuant to its order to show 21 cause. 22 THE COURT: Well, under the standard you're urging 23 that it be akin to contempt, how then could the invocation of faulty invocation of subject matter jurisdiction ever be akin 24

to contempt of Court? I don't get it.

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MR. LIEBESMAN: For that question I think I would agree with your Honor. I mean, I don't think that it could be viewed as an act of contempt so long as the bad faith standard is met. So, if an attorney exercises bad faith intending to be in this court and hoping that the Court wouldn't catch a mistake or one of the parties filed a case, then I think the Court could then say that's bad faith, that's contempt of Court. But I think, your Honor, if there is no finding of bad faith, I think I would have to agree that in this limited circumstance there may not be contempt of Court but, your Honor, I would like to keep this focused on the case here because there may be other scenarios that I'm not thinking about.

THE COURT: Would you agree that if the standard is lack of objective reasonableness there is no objective reasonableness in the position taken with regard to the pleading here, that the pleading itself was not objectively reasonable? Would you agree if the objective reasonableness standard applies?

MR. LIEBESMAN: Your Honor, if the objective reasonableness standard applies it is still my position — our position that that standard has still not been met because while there may be more than one instance of there being questions about the allegations in the parties section of the complaint so this is not questioning allegations that are made

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throughout the entire complaint, it is the parties section that were not described in a way --

THE COURT: It is the subject matter jurisdiction section.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ LIEBESMAN: Right. It is the subject matter jurisdiction section.

THE COURT: A rather critical portion, you would agree?

MR. LIEBESMAN: I absolutely agree, your Honor. But I think that Rule 11 and the associated fallout from any Rule 11 sanction, when you're dealing with an honest oversight such as we have here limited to the question of subject matter jurisdiction, I still believe as we say in our letter, that we would meet — if that were to be the test, that we did meet that and that we would ask the Court not to invoke any sanctions under Rule 11.

THE COURT: Well, how would you assert that the allegations of the complaint are objectively reasonable? Let me hear you on that. Now, I can understand you saying, well, even if not objectively reasonable there are reasons why you ought not sanction us but confining yourself to the argument which I understand you to urge that it was not objectively unreasonable to argue in your pleading or assert in your pleading that with a plaintiff corporation and a defendant corporation alleged to be citizens of the same state that that

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pleading was not objectively unreasonable in its invocation of the Court's diversity jurisdiction.

MR. LIEBESMAN: Well preliminarily, your Honor, I think I respond to that to pointing out something that your Honor sort of caught yourself saying. The plaintiff's arguing versus alleging. We are not arguing. We are not perpetuating the argument that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Yes, we did allege it. As soon as the Court pointed out that there were these errors we quickly acknowledged so we are not perpetuating and I think that goes towards objective reasonableness. It also goes towards the reason why there is a safe harbor. It gives the party the opportunity to see the light and take affirmative action to remedy any deficiency. But, your Honor, I don't think it can be the case that a mistake can be, in and of itself, objectively unreasonable.

THE COURT: Okay. So an allegation in the complaint in order to determine whether it is objectively reasonable or not, you don't look at the four corners of what you've alleged, you look at degree of remorse and remedial measures after the fact on the narrow question of objective reasonableness?

MR. LIEBESMAN: Your Honor, I think those are some but not all of the factors. I think you have to put this in context, that you are talking about Rule 11 sanctions, and if there is to be the law that any mistake in pleading subject matter jurisdiction which I'm sure this happens on occasion,

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will automatically result in Rule 11 sanctions because it could 1 2 never be objectively reasonable. 3 THE COURT: Are Rule 11 sanctions required under the 4 objective reasonableness standard if a pleading is not 5 objectively reasonable? Is a Court required to impose Rule 11 6 sanctions? 7 MR. LIEBESMAN: I think Rule 11 provides the Court with sufficient discretion to make whatever finding. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. So, one could find that a 10 position was not objectively reasonable but yet decline to 11 impose Rule 11 sanctions because other mitigating or equitable 12 circumstances have been presented. 13 MR. LIEBESMAN: I would agree with that, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: But those mitigating circumstances would not bear on whether it was objectively reasonable. One would 15 first look at the objective reasonableness of the position 16 17 taken by the attorney in the pleading or in oral statements and 18 then after assessing the objective reasonableness, then turn to 19 a different question whether there are equitable or mitigating 20 circumstances which may call upon the Court not to impose 21 sanctions.

MR. LIEBESMAN: Your Honor, I do think, though, that some of the issues can still go to objective reasonableness. For example --

THE COURT: You are not conflating the two standards?

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MR. LIEBESMAN: I don't think so, your Honor.

THE COURT: I see.

MR. LIEBESMAN: Because it is not strict liability, it is objective so it is objective versus subjective.

THE COURT: That's what I just finished saying, is that determining that something was objectively unreasonable does not require, therefore I'm asking you whether it requires the imposition of sanctions and you urge that it does not. That makes it not strict liability but the determination of objective reasonableness is a step along the way.

MR. LIEBESMAN: Your Honor, two responses.

I would still say it is strict liability by making a finding. You may not impose the Rule 11 sanctions. I think it goes to the distinction between strict liability and damages. If there is a strict liability finding you were negligent but there were no damages we are not going to impose Rule 11 sanction. I do still think that if there is any mistake made that it is automatically deemed objective reasonableness and the sole question is for the Court to decide whether or not to impose sanctions under Rule 11. I still think that's a finding of strict liability, it is a question of what are the damages. Are you going to be found liable on Rule 11 and sanctioned under Rule 11 or not.

But, your Honor, as an example, I don't know how many times there are complaints filed in this court where instead of

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using the word "citizen" the plaintiff's lawyer uses the word "residents." I don't know. I have seen the cases. I know it has happened. I have seen articles written about warning they're not synonymous which we are not arguing that they are. So, what if 10 percent of the complaints filed in this court have some mistake as to subject matter jurisdiction and let's take the resident versus citizenship. Could it then be said if that were the sole issue that that would then be objectively unreasonable when a good portion of the complaints that are filed contain the same mistake. And that's all it is, is a mistake. Let's say that there is no bad faith or any other question about that. Again, I go back to your Honor doesn't have to impose sanctions under Rule 11 but a finding of objective reasonableness would be a finding made under Rule 11; it is why we are here, with all due respect. The effect of a finding of objective unreasonableness, whether or not Rule 11 sanctions were imposed.

THE COURT: But you urge that your pleading is objectively reasonable. Is that what you urge?

MR. LIEBESMAN: I urge, your Honor, that we made an honest mistake, that it was an oversight that does not rise to the level of objective unreasonableness under the context of Rule 11.

THE COURT: Well, that would make your pleading objectively reasonable then or not objectively unreasonable,

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correct?

MR. LIEBESMAN: I would say so, your Honor. It can't be the case, your Honor, that if there is a mistake whether it is subject matter jurisdiction or otherwise, that you run the risk of being found to be objectively unreasonable if it is a mistake.

THE COURT: I see.

So, in assessing Rule 11 I should ask the question:

Is the allegation objectively unreasonable? and then ask the question: Was it the product of mistake? And if it was the product of mistake then it cannot be objectively unreasonable, correct?

MR. LIEBESMAN: That would tend towards a finding of it not being objectively unreasonable and I think, your Honor as I pointed out in my letter for what it is worth, defense counsel, a lot of lawyers missed this and it is embarrassing.

THE COURT: Missed what?

MR. LIEBESMAN: Missed the fact that "resident" was used instead of "citizenship" and that Skoop, because it is a Delaware corporation, defeated subject matter jurisdiction — complete diversity because Pinterest is also a Delaware corporation.

THE COURT: Well now let's now conflate issues, okay?

Let's not conflate issues.

If you want to urge on this Court that a lot of

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lawyers used the word "residents" instead of "citizenship" I'm I know it has happened. But, if you want to urge on all ears. this Court that a lot of lawyers invoke diversity jurisdiction in a pleading in which they allege that a plaintiff corporation is a citizen of Delaware and a defendant corporation is a citizen of Delaware and we're not dealing with something like CAFA which only requires minimal diversity, not complete diversity, I respectfully ask you to support your claim with some examples because I've only been doing this for 10 years and I'm happy to say that I have not observed, with any frequency, members of the bar alleging that a plaintiff is the citizen of the same state as a defendant expressly in their pleading and maintaining that there is diversity jurisdiction. So, perhaps my experiences have been aberrational and I look forward to your enlightening me as to the frequency as to which you believe this happens in this Court. MR. LIEBESMAN: Your Honor, that was not the point that I was making, with all due respect, your Honor. I do understand or believe that that probably never, if ever happens --

THE COURT: Well, it happened here.

MR. LIEBESMAN: Right, it happened here, but the only reason why, your Honor, that I bring that point up is just because we were having this discussion about objective reasonableness and while we made the mistake, it was an honest

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mistake, it was something that was overlooked on our part but it was something that was overlooked as well by defense counsel. So, I think it just goes to objective reasonableness.

Again, we are talking about the subject matter jurisdiction portion of a complaint and you're right, perhaps people take it for granted that those sections are drafted properly and you see the word "resident," you think citizenship, whatever the case may be, but I only bring that point up because I think it goes to whether or not there is objective reasonableness.

THE COURT: Well, Quinn Emanuel representing Pinterest takes a somewhat different viewpoint. They say, oh, we knew that both the plaintiff corporation and the defendant corporation were alleged to be Delaware corporations but we decided that instead of invoking the Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction we were going to urge the Court to reach an issue of whether or not the Court had authority or whether the plaintiff had authority to institute a suit on behalf of the entity. Where is the showing of authority beyond the plaintiff's signature on the pleading that he represents the entity just as defendant's counsel signed a pleading representing that they were authorized to do so by Pinterest? Where is there more from the plaintiff than that representation by plaintiff's counsel at the conclusion of the pleading? And where does this entity have a cognizable injury under Article

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III? The Court should sidestep the lack of diversity				
jurisdiction to reach these issues which will have value to my				
client because we will be able to argue that this was a ruling				
on the merits and stop you from filing stop the plaintiffs				
from filing suits in other courts?				
So, I don't think it is accurate to say that in the				
case of Pinterest that they were unaware of the Court's lack of				
subject matter jurisdiction because there was no diversity.				
They appear to have been aware of it and refrained from raising				
it. That's a different issue of which this Court is well				
aware.				
MR. LIEBESMAN: That may be the case, your Honor.				
THE COURT: Anything else?				
MR. LIEBESMAN: Unless your Honor has any other				
questions, I don't think so.				
THE COURT: All right.				
Mr. Palella, anything?				
MR. PALELLA: No, your Honor. I have nothing to add				
other than to individually apologize to the Court.				
THE COURT: Mr. Pachman, anything.				
MR. PACHMAN: Your Honor, I would like to add to that				
apologies on my individual behalf as well.				
THE COURT: All right.				
Does any defendant have anything they wish to say?				
MR. CARLINSKY: Your Honor, I just would like to				

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respond to the point that your Honor just raised about we were aware but failed to raise it.

With respect --

THE COURT: I think elected not to raise it might be a more appropriate way to describe it.

MR. CARLINSKY: Well, with respect, your Honor, the way we elected to raise it was to point out that we believed — and we put it in our letter — we believed that the addition of those corporate plaintiffs was improper and we believe and still believe and respectfully submit that under the law the Court could look to whether the addition of those two corporate plaintiffs was proper or, in effect, fraudulent, a fraudulent type of amendment that would have the effect of defeating diversity.

THE COURT: No, no, no. The Court should, despite the face of the pleading reflecting a lack of diversity, you urge that the Court ignore that and go on to a further inquiry.

Do you not, Mr. Carlinsky?

MR. CARLINSKY: We do. Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. That's what I thought.

MR. CARLINSKY: And if I could just add, the situation that we typically see is where a plaintiff files a suit in State Court and facially there is no diversity but a defendant removes, nevertheless to Federal Court, claiming that although facially if you literally just looked at the constellation of

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the parties, there would be no diversity but, nevertheless, the defendant raises the argument that the inclusion of a party was done in a sham sort of way in order to defeat diversity jurisdiction.

I think this really has a close parallel to that and our point in reading this and in fact in specifically pointing out, I mean our letter, your Honor, says that the issue of Schroeder's apparent lack of authority to add the two companies as co-plaintiffs is a threshold issue of subject matter jurisdiction that must be resolved now. The point we were making --

THE COURT: No. That's a factual inquiry, correct?

MR. CARLINSKY: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So you urge, Mr. Carlinsky, as a member of the bar of this Court, that the Court sidestep the face of the pleading which demonstrates lack of subject matter jurisdiction but continue on and allow the submission of either factual evidence or depositions, discovery, going to the question of the authority of the entity to file suit and reach that question rather than the question that appears on the face of the pleading.

Isn't that correct, Mr. Carlinsky?

MR. CARLINSKY: Yes, your Honor. We did.

THE COURT: Okay. That's what I thought.

MR. CARLINSKY: And again I would add, I think that

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based on the law as I understand it, the Court can always determine its subject matter jurisdiction. We believe, and I continue to believe, your Honor, that the addition of those two plaintiffs, if the Court wished to -- again the plaintiff can always file a Rule 41 dismissal which they haven't, but we continue to believe, your Honor, that the Court can look at this issue just like it could look at a facially -- a complaint that is removed that on its face does not plead complete diversity.

THE COURT: And why would it be a provident exercise of discretion if it is discretionary for this Court to overlook the facial lack of diversity to reach the factual question of whether or not the law firm that signed the pleading as counsel for the entity was in fact authorized to sign the pleading as counsel for the entity?

MR. CARLINSKY: Well, the issue of the Court's discretion is an issue of the Court's discretion.

THE COURT: No. I asked you why would it be a provident exercise of discretion. That's my question for you, Mr. Carlinsky.

MR. CARLINSKY: Because we have now been in front of the Court and the Court has some familiarity with the case acknowledging that it is early on in the case. But, I also come back to remember what the original complaint alleged so what we had in the original complaint was purely an allegation

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that this was the plaintiff's and the plaintiff's only case
claim rights, etc. We then have an amendment, an amendment
that all of a sudden adds these two corporate plaintiffs but
still does not allege that these plaintiffs suffered injury, in
fact owned any of the rights in question, number one, and
despite outside of the court our correspondence asking the
plaintiff to articulate the basis is there authority for these
plaintiffs to be added we received no response.

THE COURT: Mr. Carlinsky, have you had much success with trying this approach, you or your firm, in other federal courts around the country where a case, on its face, has no diversity jurisdiction but you prefer the Court to reach issues of authority, case or controversy, or the like?

MR. CARLINSKY: I have -- that's a tough question, your Honor. I have a similar issue right now in a case in California but --

THE COURT: A federal court?

MR. CARLINSKY: A federal court where the defendant ——
I don't know that there is a case that aligns like this one,
your Honor, quite candidly, where the plaintiff has later
amended to allege or add plaintiffs that defeat diversity but
the law in the case I have in California is a factual challenge
to subject matter jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Do you practice much in federal court, Mr. Carlinsky?

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MR. CARLINSKY: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. CARLINSKY: I do.

All I'm saying is in no way shape or form were we attempting to not advise the Court that there is a subject matter jurisdiction issue. I mean, I think that is reflected in our letter and it is also to say to the plaintiff we don't understand with the way you've pleaded your complaint how there is subject matter jurisdiction but we don't accept that the addition of these two plaintiffs was proper. And it looked to us, your Honor, with respect, as an attempt to get out of this Court, rightfully or wrongfully, and all we were trying to do was to bring to the Court's attention that should the Court wish this comes back to the Court's discretion. Should the Court wish we believe that there can be mounted a factual challenge to whether or not the allegations -- what the law says is where there is a factual challenge the Court is to disregard the truthfulness or veracity of the allegations of jurisdiction.

THE COURT: I have read 12(b)(1) and the case law thereunder, Mr. Carlinsky. Thank you.

MR. CARLINSKY: Very well. Thank you.

Is there anything else I can answer for the Court? I just want to make it clear, again, it was our intent to just raise the issue so that it could be properly addressed.

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1	THE COURT: If the Court wanted to kind of thing.				
2	MR. CARLINSKY: Yes, your Honor.				
3	THE COURT: That's what you asked me when I go back				
4	and reread your letter, as I will, I'm going to take away that				
5	you're being helpful in bringing this to the Court's attention				
6	in case the Court wanted to address it.				
7	MR. CARLINSKY: I would go one step beyond that.				
8	THE COURT: Yes.				
9	MR. CARLINSKY: I would say what we were doing was				
10	raising it because we think it is appropriate for there to be a				
11	factual determination as to the validity of the allegations				
12	regarding these two named plaintiffs and their inclusion in the				
13	case and that's a point we were trying to raise, that so that				
14	the Court can determine its jurisdiction the first issue that				
15	we needed to address was whether it was proper, the propriety				
16	of adding these two named plaintiffs.				
17	THE COURT: You agree there is no subject matter				
18	jurisdiction in this court, correct?				
19	MR. CARLINSKY: I don't agree with that your Honor.				
20	THE COURT: You think there is subject matter				
21	jurisdiction in this court?				
22	MR. CARLINSKY: I think there could be subject matter				
23	jurisdiction in this court.				
24	THE COURT: I see.				
25	MR. CARLINSKY: I think that goes back to the factual				

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challenge question. Now, of course the Court has the discretion to say I'm not accepting the invitation, in essence, to look at the question, but I do think the Court can find subject matter jurisdiction just like when you have that — the analogy I was analogizing to just like when you have a pleading that comes up that facially does not plead complete diversity. The Court there, of course, will look at it is brought on by motion. I don't have to tell your Honor, your Honor knows this, but I don't think there is any real difference here in the way in which this issue now is before the Court should the Court decide to look at this factually. On the other hand it doesn't have to and as I said, the plaintiff always here, I can't think of a reason why —

THE COURT: But you urge me to do this so that I would, at your urging, then say there is no subject matter jurisdiction?

MR. CARLINSKY: No. Just the opposite, your Honor.

Just the opposite, your Honor. I'm urging, I think,

collectively we're urging that if the Court were to find that

these plaintiffs which we don't believe are properly now in the

case because the allegations are no interest, no harm and now

clearly no demonstration of the authority, your Honor could say

these plaintiffs were added effectively as a sham, I'm going to

eliminate them, disregard them, and therefore diversity would

exist.

order to show cause

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               THE COURT: What is your demonstration of authority on
      your pleading on behalf of Pinterest?
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               MR. CARLINSKY: I haven't submitted a pleading, but in
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      terms of the letters we have asked for any demonstration of
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      authority. We've corresponded --
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               THE COURT: What is yours?
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               MR. CARLINSKY: I'm sorry?
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               THE COURT: What is yours?
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               MR. CARLINSKY: In terms of our --
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               THE COURT: You signed a letter to me representing
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      that you're counsel for defendant Pinterest. What is yours?
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               MR. CARLINSKY: My representation that I represent
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     Pinterest.
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               THE COURT: Well, that's what I have from the
     plaintiffs.
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               MR. CARLINSKY: It hasn't been challenged.
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               THE COURT: Mr. Carlinsky, that's what I have from the
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     plaintiffs.
               MR. CARLINSKY: But the difference I would submit,
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      your Honor, is that our jurisdiction -- I'm sorry our
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      authority, with all respect, has not been challenged, just like
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      the plaintiffs -- the original plaintiffs and their
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      representation by the law firm was not something that we
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      challenged. It was only the inclusion of these two corporate
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      entities which we understand again we are strangers to the
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transaction but we understand there were these entities. It is now pleaded. If the entities observed the rights there may be conflict with the plaintiff so we raise that question but it was only in the context -- if there is a challenge to my authority I'm happy to get from the general counsel, the board of directors what needs be done to make that demonstration, but I don't understand there to be any challenge. Here there is and there is a challenge, not just we're challenging for the sake of challenging but what we have is an initial complaint that alleges one thing, we then have a subsequent complaint that alleges something quite different and conflict or tension between those plaintiffs and a belief, at least as I understand it from the allegations, that Mr. Cohen never authorized the filing of the suit on behalf of the entities. So, there is a good faith basis for challenging the authority.

That's my answer, your Honor, but I'm happy to demonstrate that we have been retained. I can submit my engagement letter but there hasn't been any challenge. And I'm not challenging the authority of the plaintiff's counsel to represent Mr. Schroeder.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Fischer or Mr. Bart, anything to add?

MR. FISCHER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, all. Thank you, all, for coming in, and I will issue a decision shortly.

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